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Legal Education, Art Before Science: 
Surrendering the Socratic Method Jeopardizes the Political Future 
 
Ryan W. Peterson 
 
“Education is the  
kindling of a flame, 
not the filling 
of a vessel.”  
— Socrates 
INTRODUCTION  
 
 As the outcry for social change breaks from the throats of American cities, the partisan 
nature of public discourse and political tension raises one of the most important questions of our 
time: what role does the law play in uniting or dividing a nation? While this question sits at the 
forefront, the answer remains imperceptible without a firm grasp on what the law is, how it 
develops, and upon what foundation it depends. Or put another way, the answer begins by asking 
more questions. 
 This paper cannot hope to supply the answers; it merely seeks to identify the importance 
of legal institutions in the success or failure of public discourse and politics in the United States. 
In order to understand the way in which the law’s effectiveness has decayed in recent decades, 
this paper looks to the changes in legal pedagogy with particular focus on the movement away 
from the Socratic Method in favor of more fact-based, lecture-based approaches. This shift is 
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pivotal as it serves to undermine not only the education received by those who embark upon the 
profession of law but also reframes the law from an art form, emerging through student-centric 
inquiry and advocacy to a brute science, the only requirement of which is to know what the 
student has been told. This is to say, by removing the critical-thinking focus of legal reasoning 
and replacing it with fact-based, memorization methods of teaching, the law itself evolves from a 
pursuit of understanding to a pursuit of the correct answer as dictated. In the case of political 
discourse, this moves the narrative from one of active engagement to one of irreconcilable 
differences, in which one party is right, one party is wrong, and neither party is understood. 
 In order to rebuild the foundations of legal education that so valuably support our 
political institutions, it is critical to rethink the motivations for and the replacement methods 
invoked with regard to the near-total abolishment of the Socratic Method in law-school courses. 
While this paper acknowledges the drawbacks of the Socratic approach, the desire is to identify 
these weaknesses as well as the potential benefits of adaptation above abolition. The scope of 
this paper will extend to address the primary critiques of the Socratic Method by proposing three 
adaptations to the Method itself. This will be done by laying out an argument in favor of: 1) 
expanding the Socratic Method to include broader engagement by the class, rather than wholly 
dependent on questions designed to simply reach a professor’s knowledge; 2) using the Socratic 
Method to give voice to underrepresented populations and experiences in order to expand 
empathy and moral imagination in the legal community; 3) mitigating the potentially detrimental 
impact of the Socratic Method by increasing professorial understanding of cultural and personal 
backgrounds which shape student engagement, requiring deeper empathy not only on the part of 
students but on the part of those entrusted to guide their way. 
 
 3 
Pedagogy as an inherently political process 
 
 Legal education is inherently a political process with political consequences. The 
connection between education and politics was the focal point of Raymond Williams’ research 
and writing. Williams imagined education as a process of learning, conducive to the expansion of 
community and democracy. According to Williams, education is the means through which 
people immerse themselves in a common culture in order to refine their beliefs against the 
individual experiences of others. Williams argued that education is not only the transference of 
information, it is also a means of deconstructing social hierarchies and rebuilding political 
communities. Individuals in institutions of higher education are in a position to process 
information and develop skills by interacting with others with whom they would not normally 
engage. This process is a working model for democratic societies and advances politically 
desirable inspiration for democratic institutions. 
 Part of Williams’ argument is the idea that the educational process moves in both 
directions; it is in the classroom setting where instructors and students can meet as equals and 
share in a democratic learning experience. Williams is not suggesting pure equality in the 
classroom. Rather, the student and the instructor are equals in their capacity to learn and their 
observations of the world. While the instructor possesses expertise by virtue of age and practice, 
each student possesses a unique compilation of experiences which may contribute to the 
discourse.  
 In the right setting—and practiced in the right form—education teaches students that they 
can challenge authority and change perspectives. In this way, Williams’ suggestion is similar to 
Aristotle’s perspective on learning virtue, as eloquently illuminated by Myles Burnyeat. 
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According to Burnyeat’s interpretation, students must learn “what is noble and just not by 
experience of or induction from a series of instances, nor by intuition, but by learning to do noble 
and just things, by being habituated to noble and just conduct.1” Educational challenges posed by 
the professor in guided scenarios train the students to rise up and answer the call to become an 
expert.  Such an education is an ideal exercise for what students will experience in public life. 
Through this approach of learning virtue through guided experience, students gain confidence 
that their beliefs matter through their engagement in civil society. These interactions between the 
students themselves, as well as interactions between students and the professor, sharpen the skills 
of all parties involved. Each party has the privilege to learn from the others, and to offer their 
best characteristics from which others in turn may learn.2  
 Paulo Freire built off of Williams’ work and developed his own insights into the 
significance of pedagogy. In Freire’s 1968 work, “Pedagogy of the Oppressed”, he links 
pedagogical structures to political mindsets and outcomes. According to Freire, a “liberating 
education consists in acts of cognition, not mere transferals of information. It is a learning 
situation in which the cognizable object intermediates the cognitive actors-teacher on the one 
hand and students on the other.”3 Freire argued for a form of education which proceeded through 
dialogue and transformed the teacher-of-the-student into the student-of-the-teacher. The 
education of the oppressed follows the transfer of information, but it fails to teach critical 
thought and objectifies the learner. Compared to Aristotle’s prescription of education, the 
oppressive education consists of professors telling students what virtue is without providing 
students an opportunity to practice virtue for themselves. In this way, information is held over 
 
1 M. Burnyeat, “Aristotle on Learning to be Good,” in A. O. Rorty, ed., Essays on Aristotle’s Ethics 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), 73-4. 
2 Morgan, W. John, and Peter Preston. Raymond Williams: politics, education, letters. Springer, 1993: 225. 
3 Freire, Paulo. Pedagogy of the oppressed. Bloomsbury publishing USA, 2018, pg. 79. 
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the student. Individuals are taught to receive but they are not given the skills to question 
information or authority from which it stems. Instead of an oppressive system, Freire sought a 
system in which students “become jointly responsible for a process in which all grow.”4  
 Scholars such as Kevin Vinson utilized Freire’s work to develop modern pedagogical 
structures for what he called a democratic education. Vinson advocates for educational 
approaches which build on problem-posing as a way for teachers and students to strive toward a 
consciousness that is grounded in a humane and liberating dialogue. In this approach, the 
professor remains a critical component in the education; it is presumed impossible for students to 
learn virtue without a guide. Unguided pedagogies without the professor’s influence leave 
students vulnerable to misguidance. In this way, Socratic Method provides a structure consistent 
with Vinson’s ideal model for the pedagogy of freedom. Vinson’s form of freedom allows for 
oppressive conditions to be understood and overthrown. This requires a problem-posing 
education which works to deconstruct the individual perspective of reality. It dismantles arbitrary 
perspectives and reliance upon external sources. Once deconstructed, such a pedagogy rebuilds a 
consciousness geared toward the critical intervention in reality. According to Vinson, it is an 
education through action that the culture of domination can be confronted. Educators work with 
their students for synthesis and awareness that allows students to explore their common 
condition and work to transform political and social conditions.5 
 The cognition of pedagogy and its relationship to political circumstances extends beyond 
Freire to influence feminist theories, critical theorists, and cultural critics. Cultural critics such as 
Henry Giroux study how the political bias can become a pedagogical method itself. This is 
 
4 Freire, Paulo. Pedagogy of the oppressed. Bloomsbury publishing USA, 2018, pg. 80. 
5 Vinson, K. "Oppression, anti-oppression, and citizenship education." The social studies curriculum: Purposes, 
problems, and possibilities (2001): 57-85. 
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particularly true, according to Giroux, in terms of how private issues are connected to larger 
social conditions and collective forces; i.e. how the very process of learning constitutes the 
political mechanisms through which identities are shaped, desires are mobilized, and experiences 
take on form and meaning.6 Giroux’s primary concern is that neo-liberalism had become an 
ideological method in higher institutions. However, Giroux’s concern with neo-liberal pedagogy 
is strikingly similar to Freire’s pedagogy of the oppressed. It focuses on the exchange of 
information as a commodity for  purchase. Such a pedagogy maintains hierarchies, whether those 
hierarchies be male dominated over female oppression, financially dominated by the wealthy 
over the poor, or politically dominated by the powerful over the superfluous.    
 Scholars such as Jay Feinman and Marc Feldman apply the concerns of Giroux and Freire 
to legal education specifically. Feinman and Feldman argue that legal education is dominated by 
a conservative consciousness that affects what law students learn and ultimately how they 
practice law.7 The style of education presented in the classroom, how students are encouraged to 
interrelate and debate, and the curriculum of legal education all reflect a view of the world.  The 
Feinman and Feldman theory of legal education presents the classroom as a microcosm for 
governance.  However students learn to practice politics within a classroom becomes the form of 
politics they will understand in civil society. According to Feinman and Feldman, legal 
education itself is a form of politics. To them, it is a form with an inherently conservative bias 
which recreates itself in the legal and political institutions where indoctrinated law students 
practice their trade.8  
 
6 Giroux, Henry A. "Public pedagogy and the politics of neo-liberalism: Making the political more pedagogical." 
Policy Futures in Education 2.3-4 (2004): 494-503. 
7 Feinman, Jay, and Marc Feldman. "Pedagogy and politics." Geo. Lj 73 (1984): 875. 
8 Feinman, Jay, and Marc Feldman. "Pedagogy and politics." Geo. Lj 73 (1984): 875, 926.  
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 Pedagogy, particularly in the legal profession, is a moral practice and necessarily a 
political practice. Refusing to acknowledge the political role of instruction divorces individual 
experience from lessons. It also fails to honor the insights of students and disconnects any 
individual meaning or application to the lessons of the classroom. According to Henry Giroux, 
the political distancing that pedagogy is so eager to affect means, that education becomes 
“performative in that it is not merely about deconstructing texts [instead, education should] also 
[be] about situation politics itself within a boarder set of relations.” Such relations “address what 
it might mean to create modes of individual and social agency which enable rather than shut 
down democratic values, practices, and social relations.”9 Pedagogy should empower students. 
Intellectually, it should provide individuals with the tools to question authority, particularly in 
turbulent political times with accusations of “fake news” and media bias. Individuals are reeling 
to determine what is “true” and upon what informational sources they can rely.  
 A politically conscious pedagogy helps students learn to parse “fake news” from reliable 
sources. It instills students with the ability to question authority and determine their own 
conclusions. Just as significantly, it teaches students that it is worth speaking and professing her 
truths to the world. Giroux notes that “as a political practice, pedagogy illuminates the 
relationship between power, knowledge, and ideology, while self-consciously, if not self-
critically, recognizing the role it plays in a deliberate attempt to influence how and what 
knowledge and identities are produced within particular sets of social relations.”10 Such a 
pedagogy is not simply about the transfer of information, it is about the shaping of moral beliefs 
and encouragement of civic engagement. This is particularly true for legal education where 
 
9 Giroux, Henry A. "Public pedagogy and the politics of neo-liberalism: Making the political more pedagogical." 
Policy Futures in Education 2.3-4 (2004): 494-503: 500. 
10 Giroux, Henry A. "Public pedagogy and the politics of neo-liberalism: Making the political more pedagogical." 
Policy Futures in Education 2.3-4 (2004): 494-503: 500. 
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students will continue to craft social standards of justice, write policy, and ascend into a public 
forum to negotiate the terms of civic interactions and exchanges.   
 
Among pedagogical methods, the Socratic Method is the most political and the best for 
teaching democratic virtues 
 
 The Socratic Method provides the most political form of education and is  necessary for 
law schools. However, modifications to the traditional form of the Socratic approach (also 
referred to throughout this paper as “the Method”) in legal education should be made in order to 
foster inclusion and empathy in the legal community.  These changes must be implemented by 
professors utilizing the Method.  Professors must change their sources to include material outside 
the traditional legal text books.  Biographies, novels, and current events can serve as a powerful 
tool alongside traditional case law.  Professors must also focus on intentionally broadening their 
questions to include the new sources.  Questions must not focus on what the law “is” to the 
exclusion of how the law is developed and what impact law is having upon society.  Finally, the 
most aggressive transformation must occur in the administration of legal institutions.  Law 
schools must make a political education a high priority and focus on the inclusion of minority 
groups through smaller class sizes and a conscientious requiting policy for students and faculty.     
Historically, the first-year curriculum in law school was taught predominantly through 
the Socratic Method. In comparing the Socratic Method to other pedagogies and their political 
reliance, it is first necessary to define “The Socratic Method.” Scholars define the Socratic 
Method differently and there are various components that you can incorporate into the definition. 
Scholars such as Robert Johnson argue that the Socratic Method is really a sophist construction 
and should be applied in modern education to instill cultural and communal values into 
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students.11 Such a definition is valuable as it relates the Socratic Method to the political structure 
of the ancient Greeks. The emphasis on debate and the individual perspectives of events is a 
focal point for both Vinson and Freire in how they define a political education. Connecting the 
Socratic Method to ancient Greek education also helps develop the connection between 
education and cultural values. As numerous scholars have discussed, the legal education is not 
only an education in reasoning and the law, it is the instillation of morality and civic 
responsibility into the students.  
 The emphasis of the Socratic Method and cultural or political values also opens the 
Method to weaknesses from feminist and critical scholars. Feminist scholars and critical theorists 
have argued that the Socratic Method exists to reinforce preexisting social hierarchies. If the 
roots of a culture are sexist, if the political institutions of society are biased, and if legal 
education exists to teach and enforce cultural and political values, then it is natural that legal 
education would perpetuate discrimination. Some feminist scholars argue that discrimination is 
inherent in the Method itself, while others argue that the discrimination is an avoidable result. 
Whether discrimination is inherent in the Method depends upon whether the method is inherently 
aggressive and whether such direct pedagogies necessarily discriminate against women. In other 
words, it depends upon whether direct confrontation and the logical flow of the Method is 
inherently masculine to the exclusion of women. 
Such a position is inherently a problem for all political interactions. If the Method is 
sexist in form and not simply in consequence, then all political and legal institutions would 
require reformation.  Legal theorists must admit that legal institutions and legal education is 
inherently prejudiced against women and minorities.  However, the inherent inequities of the 
 
11 Bonner, Robert Johnson. Lawyers and litigants in ancient Athens. Chicago: University Press, 1927. 
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Method invoke broader social issues that lay beyond the scope of this paper.  By the theory that 
the Method itself is sexist, so too is any other method utilized by legal institutions – if the 
underlying issues are not addressed.  Perfection is an impossibility, but the Socratic Method 
offers an opportunity to discuss the issues and can provide a valuable tool for diversity within the 
classroom.    
 Admittedly, the focus of this paper will center on the sexist outcomes of the Socratic 
Method—outcomes which may be attributable to the system utilizing the method, rather than the 
Method itself. Evidence supports the finding that there are sexist results in the use of the Socratic 
Method, but they are not inherent to the Method by necessity. Such results of the Method are 
more similar to the education of oppression and the very notion that Freire argues against. By 
focusing on the various cultural and political outcomes of the Socratic Method and using those 
outcomes to filter their definition of the Socratic process itself, scholars opposing the Socratic 
Method define it as oppressive. In opposing the Socratic Method, such scholars aspire for a 
liberal education; a political education that better suits the plurality and diversity of the real 
world. Moving forward, it is important to recognize the shared goal of both positions. Every 
scholar chooses to incorporate different views on the authority of the professor, the role of the 
student, and the goals of the Method. This paper will utilize what is generally agreed upon 
between the scholars to argue for use of the Socratic Method in legal education, albeit with 
proposed adaptations which will be noted.   
 The traditional understanding of the Socratic Method is that the method is merely a 
process of calling upon a single student to answer for a particular case. The role of the professor 
is to utilize the process of questioning to direct the student through the logical process of legal 
opinion. By emphasizing the process of legal reasoning, instead of the specific answer or 
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outcome provided by the student, the goal of the Socratic Method is to help students recognize 
the limits of their knowledge and provide them with the tools to learn more on their own. At the 
end of the Socratic process, the student should leave with the ability to abstract the reasoning 
behind arguments, and apply it to future circumstances.12 Advocates of the Method, as it is 
traditionally understood, maintain that the risk of being questioned induces students to 
participate vigorously in the material, and thus learn more than the passive participation of other 
approaches.13 Active participation serves not only as a pedagogical tool for learning, it also 
instills a virtuous practice for Democratic institutions. The student becomes the driving 
mechanism in the political space of the classroom and practices the art of politics for application 
in their profession.  
 Despite the historic use of the Socratic Method, recent developments in legal education 
have shown a pedagogical shift away from the Method in favor of alternative forms of education. 
As early as 1996, Steven Friedland was finding that only 30% of first year professors use the 
Socratic Method. In upper level courses, Friedland found that 94% of professors are using 
lectures, instead of the Socratic Method, in the courses.14 Orin Kerr categorizes the pedagogical 
criticisms of the Socratic Method into three broad approaches.15 The first broad category relates 
to the pedagogical approach stems from the perceived psychological harm that the Method 
causes to the students. The second set of critiques focus on the allegation that the approach fails 
to teach students the skills that a lawyer really needs. Kerr’s final category is based on the 
argument that the Method advances a political and ideological agenda.  
 
12 Llewellyn, Karl N. "The current crisis in legal education." Journal of Legal Education 1.2 (1948): 211-220. 
13 Areeda, Phillip E. "The socratic method (SM)(lecture at Puget Sound, 1/31/90)." (1996): 911-922. 
14 See Friedland, Steven I. "How we teach: A survey of teaching techniques in American law schools." Seattle UL 
Rev. 20 (1996): 1. 
15 Kerr, Orin S. "The decline of the Socratic method at Harvard." Neb. L. Rev. 78 (1999): 113, 118. 
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Kerr’s three broad categories of criticism against the use of the Socratic Method in legal 
education and proposed solutions 
 
 All three of Kerr’s critiques raise valid concerns regarding the Socratic Method. 
However, the majority of the concerns are a result of social and political failings in legal 
education, not attributable to the Socratic Method itself. This paper hopes to recognize the 
concerns raised by critics and evaluate the Socratic Method as a political pedagogy which 
educators can apply to resolve the three categorical concerns of Kerr.  By recognizing the 
political failings of the method, professors can utilize the form of the Socratic Method as a tool 
to help transform the classroom into a more just and democratic space.  
 Kerr’s three concerns inherently acknowledge a desire for education to take on a more 
political form. And, imbedded within that critique, is the idea that the Socratic Method is not an 
ideal tool. By looking at the role of the student in relation to the professor, the forms of 
knowledge stressed by the Socratic Method, and through awareness of the critiques, the Socratic 
Method can actually be strengthened by the criticism for the benefit of students. What 
oppositional scholars see as errors in the Socratic Method are the deeply held political and social 
bias built into institutions. Professors using the Method must be aware of this bias or risk 
contributing to the problem of oppositional education.  
 Another reason for the decline of the Socratic Method is the rising interest in alternative 
learning methods. Currently, scholars categorize adult learning into six method categories: 
Introduce, Illustrate, Practice, Evaluate, Reflection, and Mastery.16 Based upon these categories, 
education experts developed a diverse range of aspirational tools such as lectures, group projects, 
 
16 Trivette, Carol M., et al. "Characteristics and consequences of adult learning methods and strategies." Research 
Brief 3.1 (2009): 1-33. 
 13 
illustrative exercises, and various kinetic exercises to help students learn new material. Modern 
Educational scholars advocate for the inclusion of multi-perspective methods and critics of the 
Socratic Method argue that it simply fails to accommodate students who learn with alternative 
strategies.   
 However, the Socratic Method itself does not prescribe to a singular form. There is no 
mandate that questions cannot be answered in a more communal forum were groups of students 
cooperate together.  Similarly, it is assumed that questions must be answered in written or oral 
tradition.  Professors can utilize multidimensional techniques while retaining the focus on 
questions and answers for the guidance of students. As a political pedagogy, the Socratic Method 
thrives in a more diverse student body.  The process of questions and answers allows the Method 
to utilize the diversity of student experiences to expose individuals to new perspectives. This 
both forces the individual to challenge personally held believes and ideals, while simultaneously 
preparing them for a profession deeply imbedded in politics. The Method would fail if it could 
not incorporate other techniques through the questioning process. Current research shows that 
the most important component in learning and retaining is the student’s active participation in the 
education process; this is the strength of the Socratic Method. The Method can be adaptive 
broaden student engagement and to incorporate the second category of criticism. This may 
extend to questions which seek the students’ experiences and understanding rather than being 
designed to reach an answer the professor holds aloft. By integrating this modification, inclusion 
becomes a dual focus with understanding. 
   This paper examines all three of Kerr’s broad categories of criticism. It will also discuss 
the development of alternative methods of legal education and how they can be incorporated into 
the Socratic approach. Finally, this paper hopes to show that the shift away from the Socratic 
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Method in law school is an error. Observations from all three categories of criticism are deeply 
concerned with the political implications of the practice itself. However, by observing the results 
of social and political bias, such critiques have discarded the benefit of the Socratic Method as a 
viable ally in resolving such institutional troubles. Focusing on the political process and the 
critiques of scholars can increase awareness of the professors, as well as strengthen the Socratic 
Method for the benefit of the student. Furthermore, the Method itself is designed to maximize 
student participation in the educational process. The flexibility and dynamism of the Socratic 
Method makes it the ideal tool for legal education, one which should not be abandoned so 
quickly in light of current criticisms.    
 
Kerr’s first category of criticism: the Method fails to teach the substance of the law.  Such a 
criticism maintains a profound misunderstanding of what the law is and what is the 
purpose of a legal education.  
 
 The political characteristics of the Socratic Method make it the ideal method to help 
students derive a stronger understanding of law and better skills for legal practice. This is 
particularly true in the scope of legal scholars such as Amy Kapczynski. Kapczynski argues that 
the relationship between the law and politics is essentially a matter of specific form 
requirements. Courts and lawyers must provide legal reasons for essentially political decisions, 
but the mechanism and focus of persuasion is the same pertinent factor in both law and politics. 
In this lens, the difference between politics and law is not a difference in topics to be treated nor 
in the criteria for decisions. The difference is not even a distinction of practical, relevant or 
institutional forms; the only difference is the language used.17      
 
17 Kapczynski, Amy. “Partisan Warriors and Political Courts.” Law and Political Economy, 1 Oct. 2018, 
https://lpeblog.org/2018/10/01/partisan-warriors-and-political-courts/ 
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 Even if Kapczynski is wrong, there is a long history of using the Socratic Method in legal 
and political education. The Method became the primary pedagogy of legal education when 
Christopher Columbus Langdell implemented the Case System at Harvard University.18 The 
Case System focused students’ attention on reading published legal opinions written by judges. 
Students attended class where the professor would question students regarding the opinions they 
read. Questions focused on discerning the critical facts of the case, parsing the logic of the 
courts, and then applying the same logic to hypothetical situations. The Method, later referred to 
as the Socratic Method, became such a success that it was adopted by law schools throughout the 
United States.  
 Tradition and the survival of the Method alone is no reason to retain the Socratic Method, 
but it does raise the question of why law schools continued to adopt the Socratic Method and 
how it remained the dominant pedagogy in legal education. One theory for the Method’s success 
is the fact that it taught students the critical necessities of the law, the same necessities required 
in civil society. Considering alternative methods, the lecture method itself is older than the 
Socratic Method and existed in Europe long before Langdell’s innovation at Harvard. The fact 
that the Socratic Method has persisted should trigger inquiry from modern educators who 
advocate for new approaches.   
 Critics of the Socratic Method argue that the Method does not actually teach students 
what they need to learn. Such criticism is largely driven by the development of legal positivism. 
Legal positivism is the belief that the law exists as fact; like an artifact independent of individual 
thought or perception. The theory of Legal Positivism developed into the primary jurisprudential 
 
18 Schofield, William. "Christopher Columbus Langdell." The American Law Register (1898-1907) 55.5 (1907): 
273-296. 
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theory by 2000.19 Legal scholars appreciated the scientific approach to law and utilized legal 
positivism as the solution against alleged bias and accusations of judicial activism. In other 
words, it was the goal of legal positivism to separate law and politics. Thus, according to 
positivist theory, law should be taught independently from any political pedagogy. One effect of 
legal positivism was that law was understood to be a finite entity, which could be known through 
examination; similar to the way geology studies rocks and biology studies life, the law had its 
own objective scope of study, subject to review. With this perspective came the option of 
teaching the law as an objective science. Legal scholars began teaching what the law is, rather 
than how the law is processed and contemplated.  
 This method of instruction has a stark similarity to the pedagogies of oppression studied 
by Freire. The professor became the controller of information and a dictator in the classroom. 
Individuals were supposed to mimic and repeat lessons according to the professors’ satisfaction, 
rather than criticize the logic or attempt any innovative thought of their own. The lecture method 
is highly applicable to hard sciences and circumstances where a direct transfer of knowledge is 
necessary. However, the study of law is a political practice, absent any tangible information that 
the professor needs to pass to students. Because of legal positivism, the study of law became a 
science rather than an exercise. With the divide between the object of law and the inquiry of law, 
legal education was itself liberated from social questions, political diversity, and the classical 
challenges that pervaded law schools and made law such a salient political subject. In the words 
of John Austin, one of the founders of legal positivism, “the existence of law is one thing; its 
merit and demerit another. Whether it be or be not is one enquiry; whether it be or be not 
conformable to an assumed standard, is a different enquiry.”20 
 
19 Bix, Brian H. "Legal positivism." Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory (2005). 
20 Austin, John. "The Province of Jurisprudence Determined, 5th edn, 1885, repr. 1995." 157. 
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 The split in inquiry between the law and politics made any analysis or reasoning 
irrelevant to the legal education. As such, there was no reason to engage with it as a question. 
This split also gave rise to the opportunity for unquestioned bias and cultural discrimination to 
enter more prevalently into legal education. Undoubtedly, legal education was sexist prior to the 
invention of Legal Positivism and it remains sexist today. However, the new objective law 
allowed the discrimination to continue as a political and social question, irrelevant to the law. 
The same mechanism that made the legal method an education of oppression also precluded 
examination of beliefs and practices. If qualified immunity for law enforcement results in a 
disproportionate deaths in minority communities, then that was outside the boundaries of law.  
Practitioners of law are taught to ignore the impact of the law.  Consistent with Freire’s theory of 
oppressive education, methods under Legal Positivism fail to instruct students to examine their 
implicit role in injustice and their power to help improve democratic societies. By failing to 
examine the influence of law in society, legal education implicitly strengthens the existing 
hierarchies by allowing students to maintain their bias without reflection.   
 As contemplation of the law divorced itself from political considerations, economic 
realities, and sociological conditions, the criticism against the law began to rise. The separation 
of law from politics made the law subject to political criticism for feminist scholars, critical 
theorists, and advocates for alternative educational methods. Implicit, explicit, and structural bias 
are inextricable in the courtroom.21 The internalization of rules and perspectives is inevitable in 
any field that is as personal as the law and requires as much interpersonal cooperation as 
litigation. Bias was always present and inescapable in the law, no matter how hard legal 
positivists tried to ignore the reality. Edward White utilized the revelations of Thomas Kuhn to 
 
21 Kang, Jerry, et al. "Implicit bias in the courtroom." UCLa L. rev. 59 (2011): 1124. 
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argue that critical legal theory was the product of Positivist Legal theory. The presuppositions of 
each generation are predictably replaced by those of another. For an orthodox legal belief such as 
legal positivism, it was fated to eventually become obsolete and seed its own replacement.22 
Critical Theory was the replacement out of Positivism, and as a result, it inevitably sees the 
political consequences and connections between legal instructions and the practice of politics.  
 Experienced lawyers, without academic training, have argued against legal positivism 
and instead focused upon Legal Realism; what actually happens in the process of law. Years of 
experience in court demonstrates that there is no presumptive truth in the law, not until the 
presentation of arguments is complete. And even after a judge or jury has determined the relative 
truth in a case, such a truth only exists so long as it is supported by future courts. Particularly in 
District Courts, the determination of judges and juries has no precedential value. Because of the 
lack of precedent, identical facts can be presented for similar cases, and opposite rulings given 
by two different judges. At best, the ruling of another judge is merely of persuasive value. 
Critical scholars such as Segal and Harold attribute the differences to the political bias of 
judges.23 Other scholars such as Kim Pauline argue that the different levels of judicial oversight 
change the interpretation of judges. 24 
 Regardless of the arguments for how or why, what critical theorists show through 
scholarly work and courtroom demonstrations, and what experienced litigators learn from 
practice, is that judges rule differently. It is not necessary to disprove that legal positivism is 
desirable, nor is it necessary to explain how judges rule. What is necessary is to recognize that 
judges are not applying a single uniform law throughout the courts. In other words, Legal 
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Positivism fails as a descriptive theory, even if it retains its normative desirability. This is most 
demonstrable within District Courts, but it is even visible at the level of the Supreme Court. 
Significantly, the majority of case law studied in law school is derived from the significant cases 
handed down from the Supreme Court. This bias in favor of the highest court is because legal 
educators assume that what the highest court states is the law in their written opinions – is the 
law. One of the best examples of this is Roe v. Wade. Law students typically read the abortion 
case as a statement that states cannot prohibit an abortion. If law students study the matter any 
further, they read Planned Parenthood v. Casey.   
 Casey modifies the Roe holding, but still maintains that state governments cannot 
prohibit abortion. According to most classes on Constitutional Law, this is the extent of 
discussions on the matter of abortion. Professors will lecture on the maintained legality of 
abortion and the diversity of District Court restrictions and state legislation will go unexamined. 
It is unfortunate the inquiry does not go further for what is lost are greater questions of 
ambiguity. Accepting that abortion cannot be precluded does not help law students discern the 
morality or ethical concerns involved. Legal questions remain regarding restrictions on abortion, 
reasonable access to abortion, and what a state can do to encourage or discourage abortion, 
without strictly prohibiting the matter. The issue is too vast and complicated to cover in a single 
semester, but the case law can be used to illuminate the questions and challenge student 
perspectives. Teaching the black letter law as Positive truth—that abortions cannot be 
prohibited—does little to help law students understand the complexity and practical application 
of the issue.    
 The belief that a single judge or court may apply the law in a uniform fashion lends itself 
to the companion belief that a professor can lecture on the law and apply it with equal 
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uniformity. The focus of law school is transformed into mimicking a professor so you can repeat 
the lessons to the judge. Authority becomes a single entity with nondescript characteristics, an 
abstraction. However, this approach is incorrect in the law, and it is incorrect for legal education. 
In a study conducted in 1959, scholars found that from the early 1800s until 1959, there had only 
been 45 cases in which the Supreme Court was unable to muster a clear majority.25 These 
opinions, called plurality opinions, exist when a majority of judges agree with an outcome of a 
case, but they cannot agree on the reasons for the outcome.  
 More recent studies have shown a growth in the number of plurality opinions. From 1947 
until 1959 there were 61 plurality opinions from the Supreme Court. Of an even greater concern, 
the trend is on the rise as the highest Court is divided within itself and unable to muster a clear 
ruling on legal issues. Plurality opinions are a concern to scholars and practitioners because they 
have no precedential value and cannot be used to guide lower courts. Plurality opinions are 
defined by the lack of agreement regarding the law, where even the highest court cannot tell 
litigators what the law is or how to apply the law in the future. As such, it appears that the 
domination of Legal Positivism has not resulted in clarity of the law. Scholars, judges, and 
practitioners appear less certain regarding what the law is than they were with less formal 
methods of jurisprudence.   
 If the highest authority on the law cannot clearly express what the law is, then there is 
little hope for greater success from professors. Legal positivists may worry that the division of 
courts and classrooms regarding what the law is, necessarily surrenders the law onto absolute 
relativism. In this theme, some critiques from the critical theorists maintain that the notion of law 
is an absurdity. But this conclusion is not a necessity, and it does not inevitably follow from 
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observations in the courtroom. There exists a plethora of legal theories—beyond the scope of this 
paper—that argue that the law is a rational decision-making process. Similar abstract concepts 
such as morality and ethics are highly controversial, but the controversy defining what is moral 
does not negate the recognition that morals exist. The fear of absolute relativism is no more 
founded in the arena of law than it is in politics. Despite political tension and arguments of “fake 
news”, the political sphere has not been completely torn apart by the impossibility of fact or the 
absolute unwillingness of participants to negotiate. There is no reason the legal sphere should be 
any different.   
 
Virtues of the Socratic Method, independent of Legal Positivism: it is desirable that law 
students should learn political methods, even if such methods were not bound within the 
law 
 
 Law schools can engage in the debate over what is the law as a political exercise. Law 
professors can utilize the Socratic Method to emphasize the debate and challenge students to 
think critically. General agreements are possible, just as it is still possible for bills to become 
laws. Additionally, law school and the Socratic Method have justifications that are detached 
from the specific product of what law students learn regarding substantive law. The 
memorization of statutes and precedents is not as complicated as requiring three years of 
expensive education, in addition to a bachelor’s degree in a substantive field. Such a format 
would be performed best by the lecture method, but it would not serve law students well. 
Practice in the courtroom shows that the lawyer who memorized the most “law” is not always the 
best advocate. Advocacy requires an adept understanding of individual emotion. Good lawyers 
captivate the jury, they draw them into the arguments, and they manage the emotions and 
expressions of witnesses. Instead of focusing on the memorization of rules and statutes, the 
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Socratic Method can focus more on the process of reasoning and the development of the 
individual.     
 Furthermore, adept trial lawyers require an emotional maturity and understanding that 
mimics the civic virtue necessary for democratic societies. According to Anthony Kronman, the 
Socratic Method focuses students to develop a sense of “moral imagination.”26 Again, such 
statements are easily confused with moral or legal relativism, but that is not what Kronman 
suggests. What Kronman focuses on in legal education is a deeper sense of the intricacies 
involved in process of litigation. The fact that there is no single universal truth that governs the 
outcome of a case does not suggest that there are no answers. Instead, it means that students must 
struggle to find the reasoning behind answers and discern which solutions are best to the 
particular problem. This willingness to struggle with others, and the recognition that your “truth” 
may not be the absolute, is nothing less than what democratic societies require. The process of 
litigation is the process of policy development; it involves political discourse, and it is a staple in 
civil governance.   
 Among scholars who advocate for the moral maturity of legal education, John 
Cole conceptualizes this position the best. According to Cole, law students enter law school in a 
state of dangerous emotional and political immaturity. Cole generalizes law students as believing 
that there is a single truth, which when found, will resolve the crisis invoked by the question. 
This question may apply to the First Amendment and the range of Free Speech as much as it can 
be triggered by moral policy questions such as immigration and minimum national income. 
Incoming students have a belief that there is a single right answer and that when discovered, the 
question itself would be conclusively resolved. This belief, according to Cole, lends itself to the 
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tendency of punishing others who disagree. It ostracizes dissent as an oppressive pedagogy, more 
favorable for dictatorship and despotism than democratic governments. The description of law 
students renders true for most individuals who have attended legal institutions. It also resonates 
with the stereotypical perspective of law students; analytical, organized, and aggressively driven 
to problem solving. Indeed, one of the criticisms against the Socratic Method is that it reinforces 
discriminatory hierarchies based on male perspectives of aggressive assertion.   Cole affirms the 
experience of law students and the social perspective of legal education, while also suggesting an 
alternative role for legal education. A role designed to disassemble the aggressive tendencies of 
law students and disabuse individuals of the notion that there is a singular truth. The very method 
that receives criticism for harming individual egos does so in order to break students of egoism 
and their sense of privilege. Within the lecture method, the professor holds a position of 
privilege. Students with the “right answers” also hold a privileged perspective because their 
perspective is true. This position and the consequences are politically dangerous because they 
produce individuals with emotional immaturity. The belief in an absolute truth and the inability 
to negotiate with perspectives resembles religious convictions more than it resembles legal or 
political practices. This intellectual frigidity is precisely what makes religious arguments futile 
and dangerous, as there is no room for compromise.   
 Unlike the lecture, which may foster such an absolute perspective, the Socratic Method 
reduces the students and the professors to a position of equality. This is incredibly important in a 
field that persists in promoting straight, white men despite the ever-increasing diversity within 
classes themselves. That is to say, in a field dominated by white men, the Socratic Method 
presents the opportunity to hear from those with different perspectives and experiences. Within 
the Method, the role of a law professor is to facilitate debate and demonstrate a practice of virtue. 
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The professor questions students and encourages dissent to demonstrate that there is no single 
resolution. The process of collaborative resolution is what matters.27 Similarly, each student is 
responsible for their own perspective. Unlike group projects where unanimity rules the 
collective, the Socratic Method makes each person responsible for their argument. Each student 
is in a position to share, debate, and argue. This responsibility and the power it bestows on the 
student builds moral strength. It helps prevent legal and political ossification, but makes 
collaboration possible and makes the student a more confident advocate for their beliefs, while 
retaining the ability to comprehend other perspectives.  
 In contrast, feminists such as Susan H. William argue that the fault with the Socratic 
Method is that there is no singular basis for knowledge. This represents an inherent defect with 
the Socratic Method built upon the assumption that the Method profound a singular truth. 
William argues that “knowledge is a socially constructed collective experience, which cannot be 
attained via reasoning within one student’s own mind.28” William’s proposition begs the 
question; that the Socratic Method must be utilized to demonstrate a singular truth. And, that 
such a truth is limited to the rationalization of logical processes. Indeed, this is the same 
assumption made by critics of the Socratic Method who argue that the Method does not actually 
teach students what they need to know as lawyers. Such critics reverse the assumption but argue 
that the Method does not provide a singular solution. The assumption of both feminist theorists 
and positive theorists is incorrect. It is because the Socratic Method does not teach a singular 
truth that it is so well adapted for legal education and can be further adapted to broaden 
engagement. This admission doesn’t negate the observations of feminist theorists. Sexist results 
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of the Method still occur if professors are ignorant of social and political power dynamics, if they 
do not understand the role of legal education as a political process, then they are doomed to 
silence minority views and perpetuate political bias in the classroom. But again, this returns the 
foundation of sexism to the system utilizing the Method rather than the Method itself.    
 According to advocates of the Socratic Method, such as Burnele Powell, the difficulty of 
the law is not learning the facts or applying facts to a case. An education based on memorization 
and application of facts is no different than a general undergraduate education. If the law were no 
more than applying definite and certain rules, there would be no need for lawyers in modern 
society. Instead, according to Powell, the difficulty in the law is judgment. Judgment is a 
political virtue, a necessity in civic society. Politically, everyone has access to pertinent 
information. It is the use of information and how information is judged and processed that 
matters for policy, elections, and litigation. Students must learn what precedents apply, how an 
argument should be structured, and where to find weaknesses in their own position.29 Professors 
need to hear feminist criticism to use the Method as a means of forcing students to challenge 
their own privilege, or they risk utilizing their questions and the classroom as an oppressive 
pedagogy. It would be correct to understand the kind of judgment Powell desires consistently 
with the moral maturity for which Cole advocates. Such a judgment and maturity would fit into 
the deconstruction of power dynamics feminist scholars argue against.  
 Law professors retain the power to embrace the moral role of legal education.  Along 
with requiring students to read classic opinions such as Roe v. Wade, law professors can pair 
such readings with feminist novels, short stories, and news articles related to the issue.  The 
material for class can be used to enlighten students to broader political and social issues that exist 
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beyond the mere text of legal opinions.  Untraditional sources could serve as an ally to minority 
students and could help the traditional white men in such a class to understand perspectives 
beyond their own personal experience.  In short, law professors should embrace the political role 
of legal education to help law students become better advocates.    
 The skill of an expert attorney is apparent in “parsing arguments and discerning one’s 
own weakness.30” The Method demands an introspection that is difficult for students to develop, 
but is highly rewarding personally and professionally. As an added benefit, many students 
engaged in the Socratic Method find the process fun, just as many individuals find an engaging 
debate to be fun.31 Law school attracts competitive individuals, and the Socratic Method 
provides a forum for students to engage in positive competition. Individuals are encouraged to 
show their skills and leave a successful class with a sense of pride and accomplishment.   
 In response to the critique, it is apparent that professors need to temper their use of the 
Socratic Method to guide students. The professor must help individuals discern what proves to 
be a valid argument, and what constitutes an invalid argument. Professors must be aware of their 
own bias, and the bias present in the classroom, or they are doomed to replicate oppressive 
hierarchies. If a professor does nothing more than question students without guidance and 
assistance, as critics suggest, then it is a failure of the professor and not the Method. Other 
methods which may appear more democratic, such as open group projects, risk students falling 
into their own bias traps. The professor guides the morality and virtue of the class and helps 
students examine their prejudices in a constructive environment. The professor is still an 
educator who is responsible for the students. They must still teach students the art of the law. 
This art cannot be taught as an objective fact, as the lecture method would presume. Instead, the 
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law is focused on argument and persuasion. Since the Socratic Method does not presume the 
existence of any privileged truth, it is in the best position to teach students this critical lesson.  
 
What is described as psychologically abusive is an abuse of the Method.  The Socratic 
Method should induce existential uncertainty, sympathy, and compassion.  
 
 The process of teaching students how to reason, of helping individuals generate a sense 
of judgment, has an additional political and legal benefit. Through the process of reasoning, 
students not only learn how to practice law, but they also develop a deeper sense of sympathy for 
their classmates and their clients. Hannah Arendt places understanding and forgiveness in the 
forefront of necessary political virtues. In order to engage politically, we must come to 
understand the role of the other. We must attain the ability to stand in their position and observe 
the world. From this perspective of understanding, we can sympathize. We can comprehend the 
actions and struggles of political opponents and we can join in the commonality of the Human 
Condition. Because the world of politics is chaotic and changing, we need sympathy for 
forgiveness. According to Arendt, to exist in the political realm is to err. It is only through 
forgiveness of others that we can hope to amass the courage to enter into politics and voice our 
opinions in an attempt to persuade the other.32 The political necessity of understanding and 
forgiveness is representative of the virtues necessary for the practice of law and legal education.   
 According to Kerr, “the most common complaint against the Socratic Method is that it is 
cruel and psychologically abusive.33” As early as 1973 students complained that the method 
demeaned and degraded them.34 Lawrence Silver described the Socratic Method as nausea 
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inducing.35 Through the process, students have little indication of what is right, what is wrong, 
and how to evaluate the performances in class. For individuals seeking approval and desperately 
trying to rise within the ranks of their peers, such an experience is unbearable. The extreme 
levels of anxiety among law students, as it relates to the Socratic Method, can be described in 
two ways. One component is related to grades. The other component has to do with the 
perception of the law, and the social misconceptions of law students entering the institution.  
 Starting with the first component, the greatest prevailing myth among law students is that 
grades completely determine futures.36 Daniel Keating notes this myth as one of the greatest of 
concerns for law students, and also suggests that there is some validity to the myth, with a 
caveat. The caveat is that grades provide a convenient and constant metric to measure successes. 
A higher GPA in law school will correlate to better initial positions after law school. However, 
numerous studies have struggled to predict long-term success after law school. Variables such as 
pessimistic versus optimistic perspectives, goal orientation, and grit are all influential factors 
more difficult to measure than pure GPA. 37 A more accurate measure, which would consider all 
the variables, is far more difficult to determine. For students, the obsession with grades and the 
uncertainty of the Socratic Method combine into a terror from the Divine Comedy. Students are 
never certain of how they are performing, but that is not inherently negative.  
 The error and neuroses that arise from grades, lies with professors, the educational 
institution, and the administration—not the Socratic Method. Precisely for the reason Keating 
identifies, grades are easy identifiers, especially in a positivist legal environment where external 
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variables are praised for their objective value. However, instead of abandoning the Socratic 
Method due to the psychological distress it causes, law schools should work harder to relieve 
students from the pressures of a grade and insist on a holistic focus that incorporates the Socratic 
Method.  Numerous schools such as: Harvard, Standford, Columibia, University of Virginia, 
University of California, and Berkeley have already abandoned traditional grading scales.  
Research suggests that abandoning traditional grading not only lowers student anxiety, but as a 
result, increases knowledge retention of information.38  
The cynical interpretation of law schools abandoning the Socratic Method suggests that 
institutions are trying to recruit more students. If it is true that students feel dread and anxiety 
approaching the Socratic Method, then law schools might hope to bolster admissions numbers by 
promising the absence of the Method. In response, if this is the position of law schools, then they 
have already surrendered their legal and political obligations to students. A response based on 
admission numbers is completely divorced from what methods are best for teaching law students.     
 Institutional motivations, such as admission numbers, shirk the responsibility of the 
school and fail to address the question of what law schools should be doing, or how pedagogy 
plays a political role. The more pertinent critique of grades and the anxiety of the Socratic 
Method blends with the previous perspective that the Method actually fails to teach students 
anything about the law. As discussed, the misconception of the later critique relates to the nature 
of law, and not the Socratic Method. The Method does teach the operation of law, which is 
nausea inducing for anyone in the courtroom. Professors must realize the anxiety of their 
students, and when properly implementing the Socratic Method, they too become sympathetic to 
the plight of the other. The Method is not a weapon or a threat. It is a tool for the disintegration 
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of ego in an attempt to help students attain a moral maturity necessary for political and legal 
engagement. A particular grade in Civil Procedure is not indicative of a lawyer’s success. A law 
student’s capacity for growth and their willingness to struggle through the opaque uncertainty 
that is the legal process is far more difficult to measure, but a far greater indication of success. 
For that process to occur, the Socratic Method and the anxiety it creates presents an opportunity 
unforeseen in the lecture or group pedagogical methods.     
 The second element of the nausea has to do with the perceptions of law and the individual 
personalities drawn to law school.  There is no correlation between the academic promise of a 
first year law student, measured by GPA and LSAT score, and whether the student drops-out of 
law school.39 What is statistically relevant is that “Thinking” personalities on the Mayers-Brigs 
Personality Test have a lower attrition rate than “Feelers.”40 Evidence suggests that Type-A 
personalities perform better than Type-B, but are also subject to higher stress levels and greater 
anxiety. Additionally, due to social perceptions that Type-A personalities are more likely to be 
lawyers and apply for law school, there is a self-selection affect. It isn’t surprising that the self-
selection process of law school would attract more aggressive and thought-driven personalities, 
or that such personalities would experience anxiety and stress in an intensely competitive and 
academic environment. It is a mistake to conclude that the Socratic Method is responsible for the 
anxiety, or that by eliminating the Method, administrations can eliminate anxiety.   
 The primary driver behind the anxiety is not the Method itself, nor is it exclusively the 
personalities within the classroom. Anxiety in law school is driven by the administration and 
incentivized down to the professors. The first speech to incoming students focuses on grades and 
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futures. Professors stress the possible political power of students, but only for those who rank at 
the very peak of the class. Schools such as the University of Oregon maintain privileges for the 
top 10 percent of the class. At an even higher elite, the top 10 students are frequently invited to 
socialize with federal judges and intermingle at exclusive events. The hyper obsession with 
grades and external indicators is not alleviated by changing from the Socratic Method to lectures 
or group projects. Blaming the method itself acts as a convenient excuse for institutions to 
maintain the pressure between students without addressing any of the real issues. The drive for 
success stems from the pressure of the administration, social pressure, and finally the debt 
incurred to attend law school.  
Grades become the necessary driver of salaries. Behind unconscionable debt and tuition, 
law students are forced to compete simply to pay for their attendance. Responsibility for such 
stress falls on administrations and not the Method.  If administrations were serious about 
reducing stress in law schools, they would implement smaller class sizes and encourage a more 
cooperative environment within the school.  Professors should utilize the Socratic Method as a 
collaborative exercise whereby students assist and build off each other.  Used properly, the 
Method can build community and reduce the unproductive stress in legal education.        
 Even if it were possible to eliminate the anxiety of law school, it would not be desirable. 
What matters is the kind of stress that is provoked and how professors help students to manage 
and grow through the stress. The Method exists to break down the egos of individual students. 
Learning fallibility and ignorance is an existentially traumatic experience. According to Malik 
and Rukhsana, “The [Socratic] [M]ethod of pedagogy must allow for the student’s development 
of her own unique possibilities, which is why the existentialists would reject a standardized 
 32 
curriculum and an authoritarian model for teaching.”41 The persistent questioning and the 
intimate relationship formed between students arguing against each other and against the 
professor is invaluable in helping individuals perceive alternative perspectives. The law is not 
governed or dictated by a single party. It is an amalgamation of arguments and opinions that 
continues to evolve. Facing uncertainty and engaging with doubt helps students accept this 
perspective. The critique that the Method is harmful to individual egos, is also a critique against 
the process of humility. Through the Socratic Method, students are bonded together, they learn 
how to empathize with their clients, and they develop the emotional maturity necessary for the 
practice of law.        
 Lawyers necessarily engage each other in conflict. The entire legal process is defined as 
adversarial. According to Jay Silver, the adversarial process is an inherent benefit in the 
American legal system. The Constitution makes the conflict between opposing parties the 
linchpin in the courtroom, and the sure way to protect individual rights and the rule of law. 
However, he also notes the decline in professionalism and relates it to the decline in the 
adversarial process. The tension with the adversarial process is the same as the tension with the 
Socratic Method. And, according to Silver, “it exposes the dark underside of the modern concept 
of professionalism: the attempted social control of women and minorities presently entering the 
bar in increasing numbers, as well as the subversion of the adversarial process and of the 
criminal defense lawyer's inherent role in the process.”42 We need conflict in the courtroom. 
Conflict is an inherent political attribute that ensures better results, but only so long as parties are 
willing to struggle against each other.  
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 The Socratic Method allows students to conflict with one another and learn how to 
conflict respectfully in the classroom. Indeed, conflict is inherently difficult. But it is a precious 
virtue for the protection of civic society. The professor can utilize conflict to empower minorities 
and force unexamined privilege into examination. Engagement in principles such as justice, 
peace, and equality necessarily involve entanglement in conflict. Political theorists have held that 
from that conflict and the willingness to engage, individuals can find compassion.43 Law school 
provides three years of close proximity with your peers. Those years should be spent building 
professional relationships and conflicting with others in a safe and compassionate environment. 
The lecture method does nothing to teach students about each other and does not foster student 
interaction. It is one thing for a professor to lecture on diversity, it is another for students to 
engage in diversity directly. The Socratic Method teaches students about the positions of their 
classmates and begins the process of collaboration before they begin practicing law. 
 The reality of the law is that there is no absolute legal truth which exists without regard to 
the parties involved. This truth induces nausea. Struggling to defend your values and positions 
also induces nausea. Admission that you may be wrong. Accepting that there may be answers 
outside your understanding and that your ego does not dominate the conversation are all highly 
existential exercises. Hannah Ardent explains that the superfluous nature of the individual is the 
root of totalitarianism and tyranny.44 The lecture makes the student superfluous. Group projects 
make the individual anonymous in the crowed, never fully responsible for an opinion or 
argument. It is the Socratic Method that gives power to the individual to represent their 
perspective. The fact that this may be difficult makes it all the more necessary. The Socratic 
Method can ensure that such experiences occur in a constructive and safe environment. When 
 
43 Whitebrook, Maureen. "Compassion as a political virtue." Political Studies 50.3 (2002): 529-544. 
44 Arendt, Hannah. The origins of totalitarianism. Vol. 244. Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 1973. 
 34 
examined in District Courts, it becomes clear that the perspective of a singular truth is a fantasy. 
District Courts have discretion to apply numerous precedents that result in divergent outcomes. 
Additionally, should the absolute truth be possible within the District Courts, it would not be 
desirable. Each case is different and requires discretion. Discretion is best taught through the 
Socratic Method.  
 
The Feminist critique of the Socratic Method and how professors can learn to implement 
the Method more constructively  
 
 The more serious of the critiques is the accusation that the Socratic Method reaffirms 
existing hierarchies and fails to incorporate minority views, or worse, actively discriminates 
against minority views. In this line of critiques, it is paramount to recognize the feminist 
arguments against the Socratic Method. Without awareness of gender domination in the 
classroom, or the discrimination against minority students, the Socratic Method can inadvertently 
become hostile to class diversity. The desperate impact of the Method can result from either the 
Method itself or can result from the Method. Arguments against the Method itself assert that the 
Method is aggressive and the structure of questioning students is inherently discriminatory. This 
position leaves a great deal to unpack and consider, beyond the scope of this project. It is enough 
to say that if the method of questioning is discriminatory in fact then the entire political, social, 
and cultural structure of the West is fundamentally and hopelessly in error.    
 The more manageable and constructive critique maintains that the Method creates racial 
and sexist results. This criticism recognizes that implicit bias can render harsh and oppressive 
judgment against minority students who vocalize opinions. Additionally, different cultural 
perspectives can make the Socratic Method challenging for students, and if professors continue 
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utilizing the method unconsciously, it can be hostile to the diversity of the classroom. In this 
vein, it is the bias and the assumptions of the professors and the students that make the Method 
discriminatory. However, used by a sympathetic and informed professor, the Method can also be 
used in recognition of diversity. It can use the diversity to draw a broader range of perspectives 
into the public space and to inform students of divergent opinions and viewpoints.   
 Scholars such as Marina Angel note that women are a minority in legal institutions and 
within legal education. Her assertion is that the Socratic Method, as an aggressive and direct 
method, is male centric and necessarily discriminates against female students.45 Her criticism is 
not against the result of the Method, but maintains that sexism and discrimination are necessary 
components of the Method itself. She classifies more gender friendly approaches as those which 
include collaboration: group projects, reenactments, and alternative forms of student 
presentations. Such methods would utilize the cultural strengths through which women are 
formed. By abandoning the male centric approaches, primarily the Socratic Method, the privilege 
is removed from males, and women and minority students are placed on an equal platform. 
Feminist scholars such as Rhode support Angel’s argument. Rhodes writes that the Socratic 
Method “runs counter to feminism’s most basic insights, which stress learning through 
empathetic and collaborative exchange.”46 The insights of the feminists suggest that men and 
women could benefit from a more empathetic and collaborate approach, as it would force male 
students to recognize alternative methods and strengths of their classmates.  
   A very similar challenge is raised by scholars such as Lani Guinier. Guinier researches 
the diversity of law schools and finds that the lack of diversity in legal education, combined with 
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the Socratic Method, forces women and minority students to feel pressured to speak for their 
entire race or gender. Guinier’s critique is against the result of the Method, but she does not find 
that the Method is necessarily repressive. Her argument is incredibly salient and challenges one 
of the strengths of the Socratic Method. The Method utilizes student diversity to increase 
empathy and the exchange among students. As a political process, white heterosexual males are 
forced to interact with students of color, poor students, and single parents. In other words, the 
Socratic Method can force the exchange of individuals across socio-economic barriers. This 
exchange helps meld political bodies, creates sympathy for others, and affirms the democratic 
virtues of civil society. However, this same process can transform a student of color and woman 
into a minority token. Such a student becomes the unwilling voice for an entire collection of 
people. The professor and their fellow students expect their voice to stand for an entire class of 
people.   
 Richard Neumann studies the statistics of legal education. What Neumann has found is 
that men still make up approximately 75 percent of full-time faculty positions within law 
schools. Women have gained about 1 percent representation each year, but the growth in female 
representation is limited to legal research and writing. According to Neumann, “legal writing is 
overwhelmingly female, and it holds the lowest status of any field of law school teaching. The 
possible explanations may be complex, but most of them are not benign.”47 Legal research and 
writing lacks tenure status and is stereotyped as a pink color job. It requires individualized 
attention with students, and within law schools, it is understood to be less rigorous and 
demanding than the critical subjects. This prejudice harms female faculty members. It also pins 
them into positions where they cannot use the Socratic Method, leaving their male counterparts 
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to teach black letter law and engage in the political exercise of Socratic questioning in the 
classroom.  
 What is perhaps worse is Neumann’s observation that only 11 percent of law school 
deans are female.48 This creates a dominant male culture within law schools. It affects hiring, 
student recruitment, and the pedagogy of the school itself. When women do attain leadership 
positions within a law school, they are trapped in an impossible dilemma. To attain promotions, 
women are expected to behave as their male counterparts. Currently, women leaders must think 
like men, act like men, and engender male stereotypes to advance their careers.49 This reality of 
gender means that even when women are advanced into higher positions within a law school, 
they are selected for their masculine personality traits—not for the diversity of experience and 
understanding which might otherwise be provided.   
 With this critique and the statistics in hand, Guinier notes that women and minorities are 
placed within an impossible hierarchy. The majority of law school administration and faculty are 
male, and feminist scholars argue that the Socratic Method serves to advance and strengthen the 
hierarchy, such that minority groups remain silent rather than participate.50 As a partial 
explanation, scholars note that the Socratic Method developed at a time when law students and 
faculty were almost exclusively male. The method was invented for male students by male 
faculty and it inherently adopted an aggressive style of interaction. This method, arguably, no 
longer applies when the modern law school is made up of close to fifty percent women. Marina 
Angel recounts her exchanges with professors and the Socratic Method. Angel states that the 
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methods of the law school were male dominated and that the pressure and stress of the Socratic 
Method was said to “make a man out of you.”51  
 Angel’s observations and experiences are problematic for the Method. They force 
scholars to recognize sexist professors and a male dominated institution, but they do not 
necessarily target the Socratic Method. Professor Powell argues that the sexist paradigm in law 
school was a statistical matter. In the beginning, when women started to come to law school in 
numbers, more of them were reluctant to speak up in class. In Powell’s’ words, few of them were 
willing “to do battle.52” Perhaps Powell did not recognize the irony of his phrase, as battle itself 
is a highly masculine and aggressive metaphor. The more valid point made by Powell is that the 
gender of law school presented a cultural problem. The indoctrination of gender between men 
and women is established before individuals become law students. Changing the method from 
the Socratic Method to lectures or group projects will have no effect until the administration 
reevaluates its perspectives. This presents a question of what comes first; can law schools change 
the political landscape by altering the Socratic Method, or must culture change before any 
improvements can be made in the law school?  
 The concern is that by blaming the Socratic Method and failing to change the institution, 
law schools are escaping responsibility for their gender politics and discriminatory practices. 
Perhaps law schools cannot completely transform the culture, but as political institutions they 
can engage in a political pedagogy that starts the conversation. Not all feminist scholars agree 
that the Socratic Method should be disbanded. This is because not all feminist scholars believe 
the characteristics of the Method are sexist. Scholar Jennifer Rosato recognizes the feminist 
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arguments and argues from a feminist perspective herself. She maintains that the real issue in law 
school is the “inappropriate conduct of professors and male students and the general lack of 
support for women in the law school. Therefore, changing the Socratic Method would not 
address what [she] believe[s] are more fundamental problems with law school and the legal 
system.53”  
 The same problem of supported hierarchies are present in lectures, which presume the 
existence of a truth and attempt to deliver such truth to the students. It is not clear that a 
professor telling students what is true is any more or less aggressive than the professor 
questioning students. Similarly, the aggression of male students is bound to occur in group 
projects if they lack supervision and instruction from the professor. As long as cultured and 
socialized individuals are involved in legal education, the bias and prejudice of our culture will 
engrain itself into our pedagogy. If the faculty is dominated by men and a male perspective, then 
that is the perspective that will pervade lectures. Minority students will be as bound to the 
majority view under a lecture as they would be under Socratic questioning.   
 
Adopting Adaptations 
 
 The Socratic Method must recognize the criticism of feminist scholars and refuse to be 
utilized as a form of “battle.” Instead, it must be an inclusive discussion among the student body, 
a process which builds comradery and sympathy in the classroom. This is the political ideal 
which legal education strives to build. Political society depends upon plurality. Legal education 
must strive to value the plurality of the classroom and give strength to the other. Rather than a 
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society of individuals constantly in conflict and fighting, a collaborative effort of individuals 
sharing their perspectives and engaging in common concerns and public problems. The legal 
profession is a profession; it requires cooperation among conflicting attorneys. It is up to law 
schools to hire and promote more female professors who can utilize the Socratic Method to teach 
in a more feminine philosophy.  
 According to Powell, the Socratic Method presented a superior learning method for most 
students.54 The value of the Method is particularly charged in light of a generation raised on 
soundbites. The Socratic Method requires focused reading and attention during class. However, 
if the current generation of law students can only learn the law through soundbites and means of 
communication more accurately suited to postmodern circumstances, then the idea of law is lost. 
Not only does the use of law as a tool make the Socratic Method better for learning material, it 
also empowers the students. This can be a power source for minority students since each student 
has her own position. Professors must be cautious to avoid making a student a stereotype for an 
entire classification of individuals. But each individual can be given liberty to speak and express 
their perspectives. Through the Socratic Method, defending and persuading her peers becomes a 
matter of empowerment that is lost in the lecture. Empowering the students to use the law to 
defend their positions adds incentive for the student to learn the law. The empowerment 
continues from their time as a student and influences their perspective as an advocate. By 
engaging in public dialogue with the professor, an expert in the subject, the student is eased into 
the role of an advocate and develops a genuine sense of status as their own authority figure.55 
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 By working to incorporate minority views and involve student participation throughout 
the classroom, the Socratic Method can help individuals engaged a legal and political system that 
is not concerned by the abstract notion of law, but the consequences of the law to the parties 
involved. The Socratic Method is the best tool to help students understand the social, political, 
and legal implications of the law. The Method forces students to argue and persuade their peers 
regarding their relative perspectives. Each student has a different perspective and is therefore 
forced to confront the diversity of opinions and experiences within the classroom. Through the 
Socratic Method, the individual is forced to interact with the full diversity of the classroom and 
to learn from that diversity.  
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 What role does the law play in uniting or dividing a nation? The answer depends on the 
questions asked in pursuit of understanding the law itself. Legal education plays a vital role in 
the foundation and effectiveness of political discourse. Scholars find that the best approach to 
legal education is one that maximizes experiences and opportunities in the main components of 
adult learning: planning, application, and deep understanding.56 Furthermore, studies 
demonstrate that the most effective mechanisms are those that activate the learner to engage in 
the learning process.57 But the movement away from the Socratic Method in law schools has 
eroded the dialogue when seeking to illicit constructive engagement. This erosion represents a 
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catalyst in the divisive nature of modern politics; if understanding is no longer the desire, 
regurgitation becomes the default.  
 By acknowledging and adopting the critiques laid against her, the Socratic Method can be 
used to provide the best form of legal education—and in so doing, rebuild the foundation upon 
which our political institutions rely. The Socratic Method provides the best approach to legal 
education by providing student-centric, inquiry driven engagement. This method can be made 
even more effective by adapting the Method to 1) seek student experiences and worldviews in 
order to broaden engagement beyond the traditional approach; 2) give voice to underrepresented 
populations in order to expand empathy and moral imagination in the legal community; 3) 
establish professorial requirements for understanding cultural and personal backgrounds that may 
inhibit student engagement. The Socratic Method can be a tremendous tool by which to empower 
legal minds, but it must require empathy not only on the part of students but on the part of those 
entrusted to guide their way. It is time to return legal education to the art of law, a profession that 
depends upon the thoughtful application of brush strokes to evoke empathy and compassion from 
those who seek to observe and understand its value.  
 
 
 
 
 
